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Debt Collectors Allowed to Play Hide and Hope Nobody
Seeks: Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson and the Future of
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
I. Introduction
Anna Jones, a hard-working mother of two, found herself with exorbitant
medical and credit card bills after she was diagnosed with a rare type of lung
cancer. After her recovery, Anna was left with an overwhelming amount of
debt. To keep her house from being foreclosed upon after missing a few
mortgage payments, Anna decided to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee happened to overlook a
debt from four years prior that was also past the state’s statute of limitations.
When Anna made a payment on the stale debt, it brought life back into the
dead claim. If Anna, the bankruptcy trustee, or an attorney had objected to
the debt during the bankruptcy proceeding, the debt would have been gone
forever since the statute of limitations makes it unenforceable. However,
after the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Midland Funding,
LLC v. Johnson,1 people like Anna will forever be stuck with stale debts after
a required payment is unwittingly made to rejuvenate them.
Before the Court’s decision in Midland Funding, some jurisdictions
utilized a simple solution for when a claim was filed based on a debt
unenforceable due to the statute of limitations—a debtor could file a claim
against a debt collector alleging a violation of the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA). In 1977, Congress passed the FDCPA2 as part of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act,3 “to eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors” across the United States.4 Under the FDCPA, a
debt collector may not (1) “use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt,”5 (2) “use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,”6 or
(3) “engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass,
oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.”7
The declaration of purpose of the FDCPA acknowledges the “abundant
evidence of . . . abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017).
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat 2092 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p).
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665e (2012)).
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
Id. § 1692f.
Id. § 1692e.
Id. § 1692d.
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[performed] by many debt collectors,”8 and states that the “[e]xisting laws
and procedures [to correct] these injuries are inadequate to protect
consumers.”9 These “[a]busive . . . practices contribute to the number of
personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to
invasions of individual privacy.”10 Congress recognized the unfairness
inherent in the debt collection industry and passed the FDCPA to give
consumers relief from many of the unscrupulous practices of debt collectors.
The FDCPA’s teeth come in the form of injunctive relief and actual
damages along with additional damages as the court may deem appropriate
(but not to exceed $1000), the costs of the action, and attorney’s fees for any
successful action to enforce the Act.11 The FDCPA has been referenced as a
strict liability statute,12 and a violation of any provision causes a debt
collector to be liable under the Act. However, “[a] debt collector may not be
held liable under [the FDCPA] if the debt collector shows by a preponderance
of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona
fide error.”13 The debt collector also must show it maintained procedures that
were “reasonably adapted to avoid such an error.”14
Anna Jones, and many other Americans just like her, must now take extra
precautions when filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy to avoid paying money to
a debt collector who is not legally owed. This widespread issue will continue
to plague the bankruptcy system since the Supreme Court has given debt
collectors another avenue of securing payment on unenforceable claims in
Midland Funding. This Note will discuss the history of bankruptcy and how
the FDCPA interacts with those proceedings in Part II. Part III details the
circuit split leading up to Midland Funding. Part IV takes a closer look at the
case in question. Part V examines why the Supreme Court reached the wrong
conclusion in Midland Funding, and what can be done about it. Part VI
concludes this Note.

8. Id. § 1692(a).
9. Id. § 1692(b).
10. Id. § 1692(a).
11. Id. §§ 1692k(a)(1)-(2)(A), (3). Conversely, the defendant (a debt collector) may only
receive “attorney’s fees [if the] action . . . was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of
harassment.” Id. § 1692k(a)(3).
12. See Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir.
2006).
13. Id. § 1692k(c).
14. Id.
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II. History of Bankruptcy
Recently, there has been a rise in litigation involving the FDCPA in
bankruptcy proceedings. To understand the conflict, it is important to
understand the history, purpose, and realities of bankruptcy. “The principal
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but
unfortunate debtor.’”15 For an individual contemplating filing for
bankruptcy, the primary options are Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Chapter 7
bankruptcy is also known as liquidation.16 In a Chapter 7 proceeding, all of
the individual’s assets that are not exempt are sold to pay off the outstanding
debts.17 Chapter 7 bankruptcy is typically favored by individual debtors
because it allows individuals to have their debts discharged at the conclusion
of the liquidation18 and ultimately is a quicker process. Although Chapter 7
bankruptcy remains the typical first choice for individual debtors, Congress
recently enacted a “means test” individuals must pass to file for Chapter 7
bankruptcy. If the individual’s income is over the stipulated amount on the
test, he is unable to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy19 and must look to other
options such as Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is titled “Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with
Regular Income,” but is typically referred to as a reorganization.20 Chapter
13 is only for individuals with less “[t]han $394,725 of [u]nsecured [d]ebt or
$1,184,200 of [s]ecured [d]ebt.”21 In a Chapter 13 proceeding, a payment
plan is created that typically lasts three to five years depending on the filer’s
situation.22 The plan “provide[s] for the submission of all or such portion of
future earnings or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and
control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan.”23 The plan
“may provide for less than full payment of all amounts owed for a claim
entitled to priority . . . only if the plan provides that all of the debtor's
projected disposable income for a 5-year period . . . will be applied to make
15. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 526, 522 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017) (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365,
367 (2007)).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012).
17. Id. §§ 725-726.
18. Id. § 727.
19. Id. § 707.
20. See id. § 1322; see also In re Reg'l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 254 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2001).
21. Cara O’Neill, What Are the Differences Between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
Bankruptcy?,
NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-is-the-differencebetween-chapter-7-chapter-13-bankrutpcy.html.
22. Id.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1).
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payments under the plan.”24 After the three- or five-year payment plan is
complete, the bankruptcy proceeding discharges the remaining debt.
One advantage of Chapter 13 bankruptcy is that it benefits homeowners.
If the individual filing bankruptcy is attempting to save a house from
foreclosure, Chapter 13 might be the best option as liens can be stripped at
the conclusion of the payment plan.25 The drawback is that the individual
must make monthly payments to the trustee for three to five years.26 This is
a difficult and lengthy process, and a recent study showed that less than half
of those who filed under Chapter 13 ultimately made it through their plans
and had their debts discharged.27 The cases below focus on Chapter 13
bankruptcy and involve claims paid over a period of three to five years, as
opposed to Chapter 7 proceedings which involve liquidating all assets to split
the proceeds among creditors. This distinction becomes important when
addressing the rights of creditors with claims that are unenforceable based on
the statute of limitations in Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
Debt buying today has become a massive industry. In 2013, third-party
debt collection agencies “recovered [approximately] $55.2 billion in total
debt . . . earn[ing close to] $10.4 billion in commissions and fees.”28 In 2016,
approximately $3.7 trillion of consumer credit was outstanding.29 With these
large amounts of outstanding debt, third-party debt collectors have an
incentive to buy debt for a discount from companies who are not experienced
in the debt collection process. The longer the debt remains outstanding, the
larger the typical discount becomes on the old debt. Third-party debt
collection agencies then purchase old debt for pennies on the dollar.
Recognizing the realities of the debt buying process is important for a full
understanding of the issue facing the courts.

24. Id. § 1322(a)(4).
25. O’Neill, supra note 20.
26. Id.
27. Ed Flynn, Success Rates in Chapter 13, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2017, at 38, 39,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/abi-org-corp/journals/numbers_08-17.pdf.
28. ERNST & YOUNG, THE IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTION ON THE U.S.
NATIONAL AND STATE ECONOMIES IN 2013, at 3 (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/
20170518103428/http://www.wacollectors.org/Media/Default/PDFs/_images_21594_impact
economies2014.pdf.
29. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE: CONSUMER CREDIT: MAY 2017 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/g19/20170710/g19.pdf.
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III. Law Before the Case
In recent years, the circuit courts were tasked with deciding a series of
cases after numerous lawsuits with similar facts were brought against debt
collectors following a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Courts across the nation were
forced to determine whether the debt collectors’ practice of filing proofs of
claims that were unenforceable due to the applicable state’s statute of
limitations was a violation of the FDCPA. Under Chapter 13 bankruptcy, “[a]
proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against the
debtor” for a consumer debt.30 The Eleventh Circuit held this practice does
violate the FDCPA,31 while the Eighth,32 Seventh,33 and Fourth34 Circuits
refused to extend FDCPA claims to time-barred proofs of claim.35
A. The Eleventh Circuit Decided Filing a Time-Barred Claim Violated the
FDCPA
In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, Stanley Crawford had filed for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Alabama.36 LVNV filed a proof of claim to collect
on a debt it had purchased, even though the statute of limitations expired four
years earlier.37 The bankruptcy trustee paid on the claim, but four years later
the debtor objected to the claim.38 Crawford then filed a counterclaim
alleging the practice violated the FDCPA.39 The court in Crawford
considered whether debtors can pursue FDCPA claims against creditors
filing claims that are barred by the statute of limitations in Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceedings.40 The Eleventh Circuit, the first circuit to consider
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(2) (2012).
31. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). The Second
Circuit similarly held that filing a proof of claim, even if invalid, is not a violation of the
FDCPA. See also Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2010).
32. Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
33. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017).
34. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 5335 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
35. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014); Owens v.
LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157
(2017); In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 533 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
36. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1259.
39. Id. at 1257.
40. Id. at 1256-57.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1216

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1211

this question, held that the practice of filing claims for stale debts gave a
misleading impression and violated the FDCPA.41
The court reasoned that just as a debt collector would have violated the
FDCPA by filing a lawsuit on time-barred claims in state court, LVNV’s
filing of a claim past the statute of limitations in bankruptcy court also
violated the FDCPA.42 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Goldberg
stated, “[f]ederal circuit and district courts have uniformly held that a debt
collector's threatening to sue on a time-barred debt and/or filing a time-barred
suit in state court to recover that debt violates §§ 1692e and 1692f” of the
FDCPA.43 The court also noted that “[s]tatutes of limitations ‘protect
defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search
for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death
or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of
documents, or otherwise.’”44
Most notably, the court used a “least sophisticated” debtor standard in its
analysis.45 The stale claim that slips through the cracks in a bankruptcy
proceeding ultimately harms the true creditors and the debtor. Therefore, the
least sophisticated debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding may not be aware the
claim is time-barred and unenforceable and may not object to the stale
claim.46 To the Eleventh Circuit, the filing of a stale claim is “‘unfair,’
‘unconscionable,’ ‘deceptive,’ and ‘misleading’ within the broad scope of §
1692e and § 1692f.”47
B. Numerous Other Circuits Decided the Time-Barred Claim Did Not
Violate the FDCPA
Three circuits have considered similar facts to the ones present in
Crawford and reached opposite conclusions.48 Such was the case in Owens
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, in which the Seventh Circuit addressed a
consolidated appeal.49 In each case, “a debt collector filed a proof of
41. Id. at 1261.
42. Id. at 1262.
43. Id. at 1259.
44. Id. at 1260 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)).
45. Id. at 1261.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 533 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726,
736-37 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
49. Owens, 832 F.3d at 729.
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claim . . . for a time-barred debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.”50
After objecting, each “debtor sued the debt collector,” alleging the practice
violated the FDCPA.51 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit
granted the debt collector’s motion to dismiss and found no violation of the
FDCPA.52 The majority based its reasoning on the fact that filing a stale debt
claim is not “per se illegal under the FDCPA,” because the definition of
“claim” in the Bankruptcy Code is not merely limited to legally enforceable
claims.53 While the debtors argued “the term ‘claim’ [should only include]
legally enforceable obligations,” the court explained that as defined in the
Bankruptcy Code, “claim” means a “right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.”54 The court also emphasized that “the statute of limitations . . .
does not extinguish the underlying debt”—it merely makes the claim
unenforceable.55
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because bankruptcy proceedings
require a disclosure about the status and origin of the debt, there is a greater
chance the debtor or trustee will notice a time-barred debt.56 Further, the court
noted the “misleading or deceptive nature of the conduct are less acute when
a proof of claim is filed in bankruptcy, especially in a counseled case, as
opposed to when a lawsuit is filed in state or federal court.”57 The court
ultimately reasoned that filing proofs of claims that are barred by the statute
of limitations is not “deceptive, misleading, unfair, or otherwise abusive as
prohibited under the FDCPA.”58 Judge Wood disagreed with the majority’s
opinion and argued that because bankruptcy courts are similar to state and
federal courts, the same rule regarding the FDCPA should apply.59 The
dissent pointed out that trustees will not catch every stale claim, and this
allows for abuse of the system.60

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 730.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012)).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736-37.
Id. at 738 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 740-41.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1218

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1211

The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion as the Seventh Circuit
with the case In re Dubois.61 Kimberly Adkins and Chaille Dubois filed
separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.62 Atlas Acquisitions LLC then
filed proofs of claims in their respective bankruptcy cases on debts that were
barred by Maryland’s statute of limitations.63 The court ultimately held that
Atlas’s claim and conduct did not violate the FDCPA.
The court first clarified that filing a proof of claim is regulated by the
FDCPA, emphasizing a broad definition of “claim.”64 Therefore, a properly
filed claim is allowed unless a party (trustee or debtor) objects.65 Even though
“[f]ederal courts have consistently held that a debt collector violates the
FDCPA by filing a lawsuit or threatening to file a lawsuit to collect a timebarred debt,”66 the Fourth Circuit pointed to three reasons why bankruptcy
proceedings are different than other court systems.67 First, the court noted
that “[b]ankruptcy [r]ules require claims . . . to accurately state the last
transaction and charge-off date,” making it easier to show that a debt is timebarred.68 Second, the court reiterated that the bankruptcy debtor has a trustee
and is often represented by council, and both are responsible for objecting.69
Lastly, Chapter 13 debtors voluntarily initiate the proceeding, and they are
often less likely to be embarrassed about objecting to stale claims.70 In
summary, the court determined “the FDCPA does not reach Atlas’s
conduct.”71
The dissent, written by Judge Diaz, agreed with the court in Crawford and
the dissent of Judge Wood in Owens, arguing that the practice of allowing
stale debts in bankruptcy is misleading and unfair, and provides an action
under the FDCPA.72 Diaz argued that the FDCPA is purposefully broad to

61. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
62. Id. at 525.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 528.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 527.
67. Id. at 532.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 535 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 533; see also Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d
1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/7

2019]

NOTES

1219

combat abusive behavior by debt collectors.73 Unsophisticated debtors may
not know of a statute of limitations defense for old debts, and without an
objection the claim will be added to the plan.74 Most importantly, the dissent
argued this practice is an unfair abuse of the system:
At best, a debt collector who files such a claim wastes the trustee's
time. At worst, the debt collector catches the trustee asleep at the
switch and collects on an invalid claim to the detriment of other
creditors and, in many cases, the debtor. In either case, the debt
collector misleadingly represents to the debtor that it is entitled to
collect through bankruptcy when it is not.75
In Nelson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., the Eighth Circuit also
weighed in on the issue, holding that the practice of filing a stale proof of
claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy does not lead to liability under the
FDCPA.76 In Nelson, Domick Nelson defaulted on $751 of consumer debt
and subsequently filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.77 Midland Credit
Management filed a proof of claim for the time-barred debt.78 Nelson then
sued Midland alleging violation of the FDCPA.79 Refusing to extend the
FDCPA to time-barred proofs of claim, the Eighth Circuit sided with the
Seventh and Fourth Circuits.80 Thus, the majority of the circuits to address
this issue have limited the reach of the FDCPA in the Chapter 13 context.
IV. Statement of the Case
In Midland Funding, LLC, v. Johnson, Aleida Johnson filed for Chapter
13 bankruptcy.81 Midland Funding, LLC then filed a proof of claim stating
that Johnson owed Midland $1,879.71 in credit-card debt.82 Midland’s claim
stated that the last charge on Johnson’s account was more than ten years old,

73. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d at 533 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 534.
75. Id.
76. Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
77. Id. at 750.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 752; see also Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736-37 (7th
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 535 (4th Cir.
2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
81. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1411 (2017).
82. Id.
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but Alabama’s applicable statute of limitations was six years.83 Johnson’s
counsel objected to it, and the bankruptcy court agreed by refusing to allow
the stale claim.84 Johnson then filed suit against Midland Funding for
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.85
The district court held that the FDCPA was not applicable in this case, but
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed.86 The issue in
this case was similar to the issue in all the previously discussed cases:
whether a debt collector’s filing of a known time-barred claim violates the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.87 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the
practice of filing a claim for a debt barred by the statute of limitations in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy does not violate the Fair Debt Collections Practices
Act.88
A. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Court began by explaining that the word “‘claim’ is a ‘right to
payment’”, and is dictated by state law.89 Alabama, along with “many other
[s]tates, provides that a creditor has the right to payment” even after the
statute of limitations has expired, but the statute of limitations extinguishes
the remedy.90 Johnson argued the word “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code
means “enforceable claim,” but the Court disagreed and explained that the
Bankruptcy Code provisions do not say “enforceable claim” in the
definition.91 The Court also used § 101(5)(A), defining a claim as a right to
payment regardless of whether it is “contingent . . . [or] disputed.”92 The
majority further explained that an expiration of the statute of limitations has
long been treated as an affirmative defense.93
To determine whether a debt collector who knowingly files a time barred
claim in bankruptcy violates the FDCPA, the Court looked to five relevant
words in the FDCPA: false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or
unconscionable.94 The Court declared that the practice of filing a proof of
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.; ALA. CODE § 6-2-34 (2014).
Midland, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1411-12.
Id. at 1412.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012) (emphasis omitted)).
Id.
Id. at 1411.
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claim known to be past the statute of limitations is not “false, deceptive or
misleading,” because even though the claim was time barred, it was still a
valid claim.95 However, analyzing the practice under the terms “unfair” or
“unconscionable” required a closer analysis.96
Johnson argued that multiple lower courts found it “unfair” for debt
collectors to file claims known to be time barred in civil actions to collect a
debt.97 The Court, however, pointed to the differences in the bankruptcy
context versus a debt collector filing a civil action to justify a different
treatment of the same claim.98 Since Chapter 13 bankruptcies involve a
trustee, along with the debtor filing the initial bankruptcy action, the Court
reasoned these factors “make it considerably more likely that an effort to
collect upon a stale claim in bankruptcy will be met with resistance,
objection, and disallowance.”99
The Court further explained raising an affirmative defense of untimeliness
for stale claims could be beneficial to a debtor because the ultimate
disallowance of the claim discharges the debt.100 However, the burden is still
on the debtor to know to dispute the stale claim in the first place, and this
requires knowledge of the law by consumers. The Court’s logic discounts the
negative implications of an overlooked stale debt that continues to be paid by
an unknowing debtor, even though the claim is not legally enforceable. The
Court also mentioned that holding otherwise “would permit postbankruptcy
litigation” without the Bankruptcy Code providing for such a remedy.101
Thus, the majority reasoned that the filing of a manifestly time barred proof
of claim in Chapter 13 bankruptcy by a debt collector is not considered a
false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable practice under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
B. The Dissent’s Evaluation
Not all members of the Court joined the majority opinion in Midland
Funding, LLC, v. Johnson. The dissent (Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and
Kagan) began by pointing out the realities of modern debt collection practices
in the United States. Many debts today “are increasingly likely to end up in
the hands of professional debt collectors—companies whose business it is to
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e-f) (2012)).
Id. at 1413.
Id.
Id. at 1413-14.
Id.
Id. at 1414.
Id. at 1415.
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collect debts that are owed to other companies.”102 These companies can
purchase the old debt “for pennies on the dollar.”103 Once the state statute of
limitations has run, the debt purchaser’s only hope is that the debtor will fail
to invoke the statute of limitations or appear to defend themselves once a
claim is filed in state court.104 However, over 90% of consumers do not
appear for these court cases.105 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that “[e]very
court to have considered the question has held that a debt collector that
knowingly files suit in court to collect a time-barred debt violates the
FDCPA.”106 Barred in state courts, the debt buyers are now looking to
bankruptcy proceedings—specifically those falling under Chapter 13—to
attempt to collect on their stale debt.107
While the majority contends that bankruptcy’s structural features reduce
the risk of unnoticed stale debt, the dissent points out that everyone with
actual experience insists this is false.108 For example, the United States
argued in its amicus curiae brief that trustees “cannot realistically be expected
to identify every time-barred . . . claim filed in every bankruptcy.”109 The
trustees, in their own amicus curiae brief, classified “the practice as
‘wasteful’ and ‘exploit[ative].’”110 The majority also reasoned that the person
filing for bankruptcy is more sophisticated than a debtor in a civil suit
because he made the choice to file.111 However, the dissent reminded that
people filing for bankruptcy are declaring to the court they are unable to meet
their bills and are in need of assistance.112 Although the party filing the initial
lawsuit is reversed, it is not true that the debtor in bankruptcy is in a superior
position to that of a debtor in a typical civil suit.113 Additionally, the majority
suggests that sometimes a consumer will benefit if a claim is filed.114 This is
not a realistic representation of practice.115 If there is a failure to object to the
102. Id. at 1416 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1417.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1420.
109. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2526, Midland, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (No. 16-348)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1413.
112. Id. at 1420.
113. Id. at 1420-21.
114. Id. at 1421.
115. Id.
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stale claim, debtors could end up worse off than if they had not entered into
bankruptcy in the first place.116 This practice of allowing debt collectors to
bet on legally unenforceable claims slipping past unknowing debtors is
unfair.
The dissent correctly recognizes that the practice of knowingly filing
claims that are unenforceable based on statutes of limitations “‘manipulates
the bankruptcy process by systematically shifting the burden’ to trustees and
debtors to object even to ‘frivolous claims’—especially given that filing an
objection is costly, time consuming, and easy to overlook.”117 Stated
differently, “[d]ebt collectors do not file these claims in good faith; they file
them hoping and expecting that the bankruptcy system will fail.”118 The
dissent also states that the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code were intended to
“coexist,” meaning FDCPA claims are not barred by the Bankruptcy Code.119
The dissent points out that Congress can amend the FDCPA to make it clear
that filing stale proofs of claim in bankruptcy actions is a violation of the
Act.120 Justice Sotomayor correctly notes the inherent unfairness in allowing
debt collectors to game the bankruptcy system by filing stale claims; the
practice is unfair to the bankruptcy filer, trustee, and other creditors with
valid claims.
V. Why Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson Was Wrongly Decided
Allowing debt collectors to take advantage of debtors by filing time-barred
proofs of claims in bankruptcy cases, when they would otherwise be
prohibited from collecting in a typical civil lawsuit, contravenes the purpose
of the FDCPA and undermines the protections of the Bankruptcy Code.
Bankruptcy courts have limited resources to process objections, and those
resources should not be exhausted processing objections that are based on
unenforceable, stale claims that should never have been filed. Considering
the realities of debt buying today, the history of unenforceable claims deemed
a violation of the FDCPA, attempts by debt collectors to undermine statutes
of limitations, and the extra burden placed on trustees to filter through extra
claims, one can understand the reasoning of the dissent in Midland Funding,
LLC v. Johnson.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 1418 (quoting Complaint at 1, 12, In re Freeman-Clay, 879 B.R. 423 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2017) (No. 14-41871)).
118. Id. at 1419.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 1421.
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A. Realities of Debt Collection Practices Today
An overview of the modern debt-buying system is essential in order to
better understand the policy issues at hand. Purchasing stale debt is big
business. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson will likely impact the rights of
individuals filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and create a large burden for
Chapter 13 trustees. The United States, representing the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, and the United States trustees stressed the realities of the
debtor, creditor, and debt collector relationship today, and stated that debt
buying is a substantial part of the debt-collection business today.121 One
analysis from 2006-2009 showed “debt buyers paid on average 7.9 cents per
dollar for debts less than three years old, 3.1 cents per dollar for debts three
to six years old, 2.2 cents per dollar for debts six to 15 years old, and
effectively nothing for debts more than 15 years old.”122
Every state has a statute of limitations period for suits involving collection
of unpaid debts, typically “between three to six years,” and none “longer than
[fifteen] years.”123 It is the debt collector’s job to find a way to make money
off stale claims, even if they are supposed to be unenforceable. Even though
the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee and other creditors to object to stale
claims, it is inevitable that some stale proofs of claims will escape detection
because of the volume of bankruptcy litigation.124 The United States pointed
out that deliberately filing proofs of claims for debts known to be
unenforceable “reflects a calculated effort to exploit the imperfections of the
[Bankruptcy] Code’s disallowance mechanisms, and to prevent the claimsallowance process from functioning as Congress intended.”125
B. Every State Court to Decide the Issue Has Agreed the Practice Violates
the FDCPA
All other courts to confront the issue of debt collectors filing suit in order
to knowingly collect a time-barred debt have held that such suits violate the

121. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 108,
at 3 (quoting CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB
ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 10 (2016)).
122. Id. (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT
BUYING INDUSTRY 22-24 (2013)).
123. Id. at 3-4. For example, Oklahoma law provides for a five-year statute of limitations
for collection of debts on accounts if in writing. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 95(1) (2011).
124. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 108,
at 9.
125. Id.
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FDCPA’s mandate.126 Now that debt collectors have been disallowed from
filing lawsuits in typical civil courts, they look to bankruptcy to prey on
ignorant filers.127 Although there are different management mechanisms in
bankruptcy proceedings, the practice is still “unfair” and “misleading.” In
cases outside of bankruptcy, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically disallows attorneys from signing off on any document filed in
court where the claims are not warranted by existing law.128 Federal courts
agree that Rule 11 is violated when a plaintiff knows or can easily discover
his claim is “barred by an ‘obvious’ affirmative defense” such as a statute of
limitations defense.129 Filing stale proofs of claim should be treated the same
in the bankruptcy context. Such a practice is unfair under the FDCPA because
“a creditor that knowingly files a proof of claim for a time-barred debt seeks
money that it can obtain only if the bankruptcy system fails to operate as
Congress intended.”130 This behavior is abusive and forces the trustee to
spend time and resources to object to a claim it otherwise would not have to
object to.
C. Debt Collectors Should Not Be Allowed to Undermine Statutes of
Limitations
Statutes of limitations serve numerous purposes. First, they protect against
the unfairness of forcing someone to defend a stale claim after his memories
have faded and witnesses or other evidence can no longer be found.131 Second,
statutes of limitations protect against “fraud-minded plaintiffs who may assert
fraudulent claims at a time when the true facts can no longer be proved.”132
Third, they provide closure to potential defendants and the public at large
because liability will not extend forever and cause uncertainty in the

126. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
127. See id.
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (“By representing to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument . . . .”).
129. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note
108, at 11.
130. Id. at 24.
131. James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as
Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 589, 590-91 (1996).
132. Id. at 591.
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market.133 Lastly, statutes of limitations “promote the goal of efficient judicial
administration.”134
Debt collectors should not be able to undermine well-known and longaccepted statutes of limitations that serve important policy functions. Allowing
debt collectors to attempt to evade the statute of limitations by filing claims
they hope will be overlooked allows debt collectors to act in bad faith. As
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent correctly points out, this practice is both unfair and
unconscionable under the FDCPA.135
D. The Practice of Allowing Creditors to File Time-Barred Proofs of Claim
Increases the Burden on Bankruptcy Trustees
Even though the bankruptcy context offers more protections to debtors than
a typical civil claim would,136 this does not mean that filing time-barred claims
should be allowed. As Judge Diaz’s dissenting opinion pointed out in In re
Dubois, at best the debt collector “wastes the trustee’s time,” and at worst the
trustee overlooks the stale claim, meaning the debt collector collects on an
invalid claim “to the detriment of other” valid creditors and the debtor.137
Allowing stale claims and then expecting the bankruptcy trustee to object to
those claims is a wasteful and inefficient use of the trustee’s time and the state’s
resources. Expecting trustees to catch and object to every claim that is past the
state’s statute of limitations is also not realistic.138 Instead of shifting the burden
to the unknowing consumer, the overworked trustee, and the other proper
creditors, these time-barred claims should not be allowed in the first place.
E. The Practice Is Fundamentally Unfair
Invoking the judicial process to enforce a debt should only be allowed when
the creditor has a good-faith reason to believe the debt is enforceable. The
National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees supported Johnson stating,
“Midland’s defense is essentially that creditors have a right to see whether their
claims will slip through the cracks . . . .”139 The amicus brief highlighted the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
136. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2157 (2017).
137. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 534 (4th Cir. 2016) (Diaz, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub
nom. Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
138. See id.
139. Brief for the National Ass’n of Chapter Thirteen Trustees as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 12, Midland, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (No. 16-348).
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problem that information disclosed in the proof of claim is not always
sufficient to determine if the claim is past the statute of limitations.140 The
trustees pointed out that they have a “fiduciary dut[y] to the estate,” and “are
often pitted against debtors in chapter 13 matters.”141 Even if stale claims are
more likely to be caught in bankruptcy proceedings, this does not solve the
problem of some claims escaping detection or slipping through the cracks in
the system. The only reason for a creditor to file a time-barred claim is the hope
that it goes unnoticed and that a debtor makes a payment to rejuvenate the stale
debt. The Supreme Court instead should have disallowed these unenforceable
claims to be filed to begin with.
Bankruptcy experts Kenneth Klee and Whitman Holt agree that Midland
Funding is an unfortunate decision and “not how Congress would have
intended the bankruptcy system to function.”142 This sentiment is echoed by
the dissent’s warning that “the law should not be a trap for the unwary.”143 As
the practice of filing stale claims is fundamentally unfair, there must be
recourse for affected debtors. The best and easiest recourse is the FDCPA, as
it was originally intended to level the playing field and grant consumer relief.
F. Opportunities for Future Change
Since the Supreme Court has already decided the issue, consumers must
now look to the legislature for change. Congress has the power to change both
the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code to prohibit time-barred claims by debt
collectors and sanction those who make such frivolous claims. Congress could
clarify within the FDCPA that such a practice is “unfair” or “misleading.” As
for enforcement under the FDCPA, Congress could include an action for debt
collectors who file stale debt proofs of claims in bankruptcy proceedings—
specifically Chapter 13. Congress could also change the Bankruptcy Code to
disallow claims past the statute of limitations and change the definition of a
claim in the bankruptcy context to “enforceable claim.”
If Congress fails to act, however, all hope is not lost. Another avenue of
recourse may include courts that are willing to use their rule 9011 sanctioning
power against debt collectors who regularly file stale proofs they know to be
uncollectible.144 Associations, such as the National Association of Chapter
Thirteen Trustees, could also create a streamlined process for detecting and
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id. at 16.
142. KENNETH N. KLEE & WHITMAN L. HOLT, SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IN MIDLAND
FUNDING, LLC V. JOHNSON (June 5, 2017), 2017 Emerging Issues 7560 (Lexis).
143. Midland, 137 S. Ct. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
144. KLEE & HOLT, supra note 141.
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objecting to stale claims.145 Whatever the future of the law may hold, it is
especially important today for lawyers and those filing for bankruptcy to be
aware of potential stale claims and to properly file an objection.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s holding in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson is a
regrettable decision that failed to appreciate the realities of today’s debt buying
industry and the targeted practices the FDCPA aims to prevent. The Court took
a narrow view when interpreting what “claim” encompasses instead of siding
with those that believe allowing a stale debt claim goes against the purpose and
policy of bankruptcy and the FDCPA. This narrow interpretation of “claim” is
problematic. The purpose of the FDCPA is to prevent unfair debt collection
practices. Because there are multiple policy considerations for why filing a
claim past the statute of limitations is unfair, filing such a claim should not be
allowed. The purpose of bankruptcy is to grant a fresh start to the debtor and
fairly divide the assets among the creditors. Every state has enacted statutes of
limitations, and it is unfair to allow a debt collector to game the system to bet
on a claim slipping through the cracks.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court took such a technical approach to
an issue that should have been decided differently based on the realities of the
debt buying industry and the purposes behind both bankruptcy and the
FDCPA. A wiser and simpler approach would be to disallow claims that are
knowingly past the statute of limitations. This creates clarity and does not
reward debt collectors when they file claims they hope will go unnoticed.
Every other court to consider the issue of time-barred claims outside of
bankruptcy agrees that such a practice is a violation of the FDCPA because it
is unfair. Stale claims in the bankruptcy context should not be treated any
differently. These claims plague the bankruptcy system; frustrate its ultimate
purpose; and waste the time of the trustee, bankruptcy filer, and other proper
creditors.
The lamentable reality is that debt collectors are allowed to file proofs of
claims that are time-barred. As a practice point, attorneys, trustees, and other
creditors must be careful to watch for these stale claims and object to them.
Otherwise, debt collectors will continue to play hide and hope nobody seeks.
Allison Meinders

145. Id.
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